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Abstract
We propose a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol that enables
three parties agree at once on a shared common random bit string in
presence of an eavesdropper without use of entanglement. We prove its
unconditional security and analyze the key rate.
1 Introduction
When a sender, Alice, wants to send a confidential message to single receiver,
Bob, over a public communication channel in an unconditionally secure way,
they have to share a secret common random bit string, which is usually called
a secret key. Such a secret key can be shared by a quantum key distribution
(QKD) protocol, such as the BB84 protocol [1, 7] even when there is an eaves-
dropper, Eve, with unlimited computational power.
When Alice sends a confidential message by broadcast to two receivers, Bob
and Charlie, these three parties have to share a common secret key. We pro-
pose a protocol enabling them to share such a secret key under the assumption
that there are point-to-point quantum channels from Alice to Bob and Charlie
whose message can be eavesdropped and modified by Eve and three point-to-
point classical channels among Alice, Bob and Charlie whose message can be
eavesdropped but cannot be modified by Eve. Eve is assumed to do whatever
manipulation on quantum systems transmitted over the quantum channels al-
lowed by the quantum mechanics. This assumption is the same as Ref. [3] and
is a multiparty generalization of that in Ref. [7]. This problem is called the mul-
tiparty key distribution or conference key agreement. Under this assumption
we prove the unconditional security and give a lower bound on the key rate.
As a prior relevant research, it was pointed out in Ref. [8] that Alice can
secretly send a key after two different secret keys are shared between Alice and
Bob and between Alice and Charlie by a conventional two party QKD protocol
such as Ref. [1]. The difference of our proposed protocol to Ref. [8] is that our
protocol allows three parties to share a secret key at once.
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As another prior relevant research, Chen and Lo [3] proposed a protocol for
the same goal as our proposed protocol. In their protocol, Alice has to prepare
the Bell state while in our protocol she does not need an entangled quantum
state, which makes our protocol easier to implement with current technology
than theirs [3]. Our protocol is the first multiparty QKD protocol that does
not use entangled state. It is also worth noting that the security proof for our
protocol does not use multipartite entanglement distillation [6], while Chen and
Lo [3] use it.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the proposed protocol.
Section 3 shows an unconditional security proof and a lower bound on its key
rate. Section 4 gives concluding remarks.
2 Protocol
In this section we describe our proposed protocol. Let |0〉, |1〉 be an orthonormal
basis for a qubit state space, and |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2, |−〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2.
We also define the matrices X and Z representing the bit error and the phase
error, respectively, as
X |0〉 = |1〉, , X |1〉 = |0〉,
Z|+〉 = |−〉, , Z|−〉 = |+〉.
1. Alice makes a random qubit sequence according to the i.i.d. uniform dis-
tribution on {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉} and sends it to Bob. Alice also sends the
same qubit sequence to Charlie.
2. Bob chooses the {|0〉, |1〉} basis or {|+〉, |−〉} basis uniformly randomly
for each received qubit and measure it by the chosen basis.
3. Charlie does the same thing as Step 2.
4. Alice publicly announces which basis {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} each trans-
mitted qubit belongs to. Bob and Charlie also publicly announce which
bases were used for measurement of each qubit. In the following steps
they will only consider qubits with which transmission basis and measur-
ing bases coincide among all of them.
5. Suppose that there are 2n qubits transmitted in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and
measured with the {|0〉, |1〉} basis by both Bob and Charlie. Index those
qubits by 1, . . . , 2n. Define the bit ai = 0 if Alice’s i-th qubit was |0〉, and
ai = 1 otherwise. Define the bit bi = 0 if Bob’s measurement outcome for
i-th qubit was |0〉, and bi = 1 otherwise. Define the bit ci = 0 if Charlie’s
measurement outcome for i-th qubit was |0〉, and ci = 1 otherwise.
6. Suppose also that there are 2n′ qubits transmitted in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis
and measured with the {|+〉, |−〉} basis by both Bob and Charlie. Index
those qubits by 1, . . . , 2n′. Define the bit αi = 0 if Alice’s i-th qubit was
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|+〉, and αi = 1 otherwise. Define the bit βi = 0 if Bob’s measurement
outcome for i-th qubit was |+〉, and βi = 1 otherwise. Define the bit
γi = 0 if Charlie’s measurement outcome for i-th qubit was |+〉, and
γi = 1 otherwise.
For the simplicity of the presentation, we will describe the procedure extracting
the secret key from ai, bi and ci.
7. Alice chooses a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , 2n} with size |S| = n uniformly
randomly from subsets of {1, . . . , 2n}, and publicly announces the choice
of S. Alice, Bob and Charlie publicly announce ai, bi and ci for i ∈ S and
compute the error rate
q1 = max
{ |{i ∈ S | ai 6= bi}|
|S| ,
|{i ∈ S | ai 6= ci}|
|S|
}
.
8. Alice chooses a subset S′ ⊂ {1, . . . , 2n′} with size |S′| = n′ uniformly
randomly from subsets of {1, . . . , 2n′}, and publicly announces the choice
of S′. Alice, Bob and Charlie publicly announce αi, βi and γi for i ∈ S′
and compute the error rate
q2 =
|{i ∈ S′ | αi = γi 6= βi or αi = βi 6= γi}|
|S′| . (1)
Observe the difference between the definitions for q1 and q2.
9. Alice, Bob and Charlie decide a linear code C1 of length n such that its
decoding error probability is sufficiently small over all the binary symmet-
ric channel whose crossover probability is close to q1. Let H1 be a parity
check matrix for C1, ~a be Alice’s remaining (not announced) bits among
ai’s, ~b be Bob’s remaining bits among bi’s, and ~c be Charlie’s remaining
bits among ci’s.
10. Alice publicly announces the syndrome H1~a.
11. Bob compute the error vector ~f such that H1 ~f = H1~b − H1~a by the
decoding algorithm for C1. With high probability ~b− ~f = ~a.
12. Charlie compute the error vector ~f ′ such that H1 ~f ′ = H1~c−H1~a by the
decoding algorithm for C1. With high probability ~c− ~f ′ = ~a.
13. Alice chooses a subspace C2 ⊂ C1 with dimC2 = nh(q2) uniformly ran-
domly, where h denotes the binary entropy function, and publicly an-
nounces her choice of C2. The final shared secret key is the coset ~a+C2.
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3 Security proof and a lower bound on the key
rate
We shall show the unconditional security of our proposed protocol by directly
relating it to the quantum error correction by the quantum CSS (Calderbank-
Shor-Steane) codes [2, 9]. To make this paper self-contained, we shall briefly
review the CSS code.
3.1 Review of the CSS code
For a binary vector ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Fn2 , where F2 is the Galois field with
two elements, we define the quantum state vector |~v〉 by
|~v〉 = |v1〉 ⊗ |v2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |vn〉.
For two binary linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 , the CSS code is the complex linear
space spanned by the vectors
1√
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
|~v + ~w〉,
for all ~v ∈ C1. We also need parameterized CSS codes introduced in Ref. [7].
The parameterized CSS code for ~x, ~z ∈ Fn2 is defined as the linear space spanned
by
1√
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
(−1)(~z, ~w)|~x+ ~v + ~w〉,
for all ~v ∈ C1, where (·, ·) denotes the inner product.
For a linear code C of length n, define the linear code CC of length 2n and
dimension dimC by
{~c~c | ~c ∈ C},
where ~c~c is the concatenated vector of length 2n. In the security proof of our
protocol, we have to consider the CSS code defined by the pair of linear codes
C1C1 ⊃ C2C2, whose orthonormal basis is given by
1√
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
|~v + ~w〉|~v + ~w〉.
For vectors ~x and ~z ∈ Fn2 of length n, we define the parameterized CSS code as
the complex linear space spanned by
1√
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
(−1)(~z, ~w)|~x+ ~v + ~w〉|~x+ ~v + ~w〉, (2)
for ~v ∈ C1. Using the parameterized CSS code defined in Eq. (2), we shall show
a security proof of our protocol.
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3.2 Security proof and analysis of the key rate
We shall first show that our protocol is equivalent to sending a parameterized
CSS codeword with the parameter ~z randomly chosen. If we fix ~v and ~x and
choose ~z uniformly randomly in Eq. (2), then the resulting density operator is
1
2n|C2|
∑
~z∈Fn
2

 ∑
~w1∈C2
(−1)(~z, ~w1)|~x+ ~v + ~w1〉|~x+ ~v + ~w1〉



 ∑
~w2∈C2
(−1)(~z, ~w2)〈~x+ ~v + ~w2|〈~x + ~v + ~w2|


=
1
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
|~x+ ~v + ~w〉|~x+ ~v + ~w〉〈~x+ ~v + ~w|〈~x+ ~v + ~w|, (3)
by the exactly same argument as Ref. [7].
Denote the right hand side of Eq. (3) by ρ(~x,~v). By a straightforward
computation we can see
1
4n
∑
~x∈Fn
2
∑
~v∈Fn
2
ρ(~x,~v) =
1
2n
∑
~a∈Fn
2
|~a~a〉〈~a~a|. (4)
The right hand side of Eq. (4) means sending |00〉 or |11〉 n times with equal
probability, which is exactly what Alice is doing in our protocol. Announcing
the syndrome H1~a in Step 10 is equivalent to announcing which ~x is chosen.
We shall consider the decoding of the imaginary transmission of CSS code-
words. A good review of decoding of CSS codes is provided in Ref. [7]. We
regard Bob and Charlie as a single receiver. The bit error correction is actually
performed in our protocol, therefore we have to ensure that it can be separately
executed by Bob and Charlie. On the other hand, the phase error correction is
not actually performed, so it has not to be separately executable.
Observe that the bit error correction for the leftmost n qubits in the CSS
code defined in Eq. (2) can be done separately from the rightmost n qubits in
Eq. (2), which means that Bob and Charlie can correct their bit flip errors with
their local operations and that they do not need their cooperation for bit error
correction.
We shall consider the phase error correction. Let Zi be the phase error
occurred at i-th qubit in Eq. (2). We can see that Zi and Zn+i have the same
effect on the quantum codeword in Eq. (2), and that Zi⊗Zn+i does not change
the quantum codeword in Eq. (2).
Let
H2 =


~h1
...
~hn−dimC2


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be a parity check matrix for C⊥2 , then
H ′2 =


~h1~h1
...
~hn−dimC2
~hn−dimC2


is a parity check matrix for (C2C2)
⊥.
Suppose that a phase error
Zz1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zz2n (5)
occurred with the quantum state (2), where zi ∈ F2 for i = 1, . . . , 2n. Let
~e = (z1, . . . , z2n) ∈ F2n2 . From the measurement outcomes in the phase error
correction process, we can know
(~hi~hi, ~e) (6)
for i = 1, . . . , n− dimC2. Observe that the error (5) and
Zz
′
1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zz′2n
has the same effect on the state (2) if zi + zn+i = z
′
i + z
′
n+i for all i, where the
addition is considered in F2. Thus, in order to correct phase errors, we have to
find the binary vector
~e′ = (e1 + en+i, . . . , en + e2n) (7)
from the data given in Eq. (6). Also observe that
(~hi~hi, ~e) = (~hi, ~e′).
Finding ~e′ from (~hi, ~e′) is exactly the ordinary decoding process for the classical
linear code C⊥2 . Also observe that the probability of ei + en+i = 1 is given by
q2 in Eq. (1) in our situation.
It is proved in Ref. [10] that random choice of [n − h(q2)]-dimensional sub-
space C2 in C1 almost always gives the low phase error decoding probability.
This fact is also stated without proof in Ref. [7]. If the choice of C1 is appropri-
ate, then the fidelity of quantum error correction in the imaginary transmission
of the CSS codeword (2) is close to 1, which implies that the eavesdropper Eve
can obtain little information by the same argument as Ref. [5], which shows the
security of the BB84 protocol directly relating it to the quantum error correction
without use of entanglement distillation argument.
It was shown in Corollary 2 of Ref. [4] that there exists a linear code C1 of
information rate 1− h(q1) satisfying the condition in Step 9. Therefore, we can
extract 1− h(q1)− h(q2) bit of secret key from one bit of the raw bits ~a.
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4 Conclusion and Discussion
We have proposed a protocol that allows Alice, Bob and Charlie to share a
common secret key at once. This is the first such protocol without use of
entangled states. However, the amount of extracted common secret key per
single photon transmission is lower than the repeated use of the BB84 protocol
and the well-known postprocessing described in Ref. [8]. Finding a multiparty
QKD protocol with higher efficiency is a future research agenda.
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